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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 19/05/2006 Accident number: 335 
Accident time: 11:00 Accident Date: 19/01/2000 
Where it occurred: Haji Basher Village, 
Toor Kotal, Dand 
District, Kandahar 
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment 
(?) 
Class: Missed-mine accident 
(survey) 
Date of main report: 31/03/2000 
ID original source: No: MI 01/2000 Name of source: IGM 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: PMN AP blast Ground condition: agricultural 
(abandoned) 
soft 
Date record created: 20/02/2004 Date  last modified: 21/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: Task 2404-081-171 Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate metal-detector (?) 
mine/device found in "cleared" area (?) 
inadequate area marking (?) 
inadequate medical provision (?) 
inadequate equipment (?) 
 
1 
Accident report 
Access to the accident data was denied by the MAC programme manager. A brief summary 
of the accident was provided by a professional researcher who had access to the original 
documents.  That summary is reconstructed here. 
[Map references are not recorded in the MAC records, so the minefield task number (when 
available) is entered in the Map Ref field at the Incident/Accident tab as an identifying 
feature.] 
The Victim had been employed in demining since 1994. His last revision course was in March 
1999 and the time list his last leave was two days. The accident occurred on land described 
as “agricultural, soft ground”. Mines found in the area were recorded as POMZ, PMN and 
PMN-2. The demining group was engaged in Surveys (Levels 1 and 2). 
The team arrived at the site at 07:30 but did not begin work until 10:00 because of rain the 
previous day. The Victim was tasked with establishing a start point. After doing so, he started 
a boundary clearance using a manual search until he reached a belt of PMN mines 22 meters 
from the start point. He found mines one on each side of the boundary lane and showed 
these to the supervisor. He was told to move the markers indicating the safe lane. As he 
turned, he stepped on a missed mine that was between the other two.  
The Victim suffered a right leg amputation below the knee and severe lower left leg injuries. 
The time it took for hospitalisation was not recorded. First aid at the site was given by the 
Supervisor because the Victim doubled as the site medic. The Victim was then moved to the 
ICRC hospital in Kandahar before an air MEDEVAC to CMH hospital in Peshawar.  
The investigators thought it possible that the Victim had assumed there would be no mine 
between the two found mines. They observed that the detector is use was “very old”. 
The investigators recorded a disagreement between the Victim and supervisor over who was 
at fault. They found that the Supervisor appeared to have issued an inappropriate instruction 
to move the markers prior to the discovered mines being dealt with. The Victim was described 
by the supervisor as being disagreeable, stubborn and difficult to manage. A formal complaint 
describing this problem had been lodged at the group’s Head Office.  
 
Conclusion 
The investigators concluded that the Victim appeared to be moving too quickly in his 
clearance procedures. They determined that the accident was “preventable”. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 421 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: medic  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Not recorded Protection used: not recorded 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES 
severe Leg 
AMPUTATION/LOSS 
Leg Below knee 
2 
COMMENT 
No medical report was made available. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Field Control inadequacy” because the 
Victim appears to have been working carelessly and his error was not corrected. The 
provision of a very old detector (Schiebel AN 19/12) may imply that the tools supplied could 
not find the threat device, so the secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate equipment”. 
The use of the medic on site as an active deminer engaged in boundary marking was a 
breach of SOPs and a significant “Management/control inadequacy”. The investigator’s failure 
to comment on this may imply that it is common practice for the group. It should be noted that 
the investigators worked for the same NGO that was carrying out the survey - and still took 
ten weeks to complete their investigation. No criticism of the NGO charged with carrying out 
accident investigations for the UN MAC is intended. The NGO is frequently not provided with 
the means to carry out investigations in a timely manner. 
The failure of the MAC to allow access to accident reports means that the report made here is 
acknowledged to be unsatisfactory. It will be revised if access is ever allowed. The failure of 
the MACC to act with transparency is bound to raise questions over what they have to hide.  
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